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Admiralty Practice After Unification:
Banacles on the Procedural Hull
In 1966 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to in-
clude actions brought under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
and the separate body of Admiralty Rules" was abolished. This event
was widely denominated a "unification" of civil and admiralty pro-
cedure.2 It did not, however, result in uniform civil and admiralty
practice. The "unified" rules contain several provisions explicitly pre-
scribing distinctive treatment for admiralty and maritime claims., To
some extent, then, the two procedures remain separate even though the
rules have been physically merged.
But these provisions do not account for all instances of the survival
of old admiralty practices. In addition, some courts have adhered to
pre-unification admiralty procedural doctrines that are not explicitly
preserved by the rules. It is the purpose of this Note to investigate some
examples4 of this survival in order to determine whether the continua-
tion of prior practices is consistent with the intent of the unified civil
rules.
1. The Admiralty Rules of 1920, as amended to Dec. 31, 1964, are in 28 U.S.C. Ap-
pendix pp. 6183-6203 (1964), and are reproduced in 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE .50
(2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
2. The Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules used the word "unification" in Its
August 1965 letter of transmittal to describe the effect of the proposed amendments:
"We now recommend the adoption of certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure necessary to effectuate a plan of unification .... ." 7A Moopr's FEDERAL
PRACTICE .11[2] at 155. The word "unification" has been universally adopted by coin.
mentators as indicating the intended result of the 1966 amendments. See, e.g., 7A
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE .01[1] and C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1014 (1969).
3. The Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, FsU. R,
Civ. P. A-F, are the primary repository of unique admiralty procedures. They provide
for maritime attachment and garnishment; actions in rem; possessory, pettory and
partition actions; and limitation of liability. In addition, some of the general civii rules
make specific provision for separate handling of cases brought tnder the admiralty
jurisdiction. Thus, Rule 14(c) concerns admiralty third-party practice, Rule 38(e) de-
clines to extend a right of jury trial to admiralty cases, and Rule 82 exempts admiralty
cases from the venue requirements applicable to other civil actions. At the time of
unification Rule 26(a) preserved the admiralty practice of taking early depositions. lit
1970, Rule 26(a) was replaced by Rule 30(b), which permits the taking of early deposi-
tions in all civil actions. Rule 73(h) provided that admiralty interlocutory appeals, 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (1970), were still available. The provision in Rule 73(h) was trans-
ferred to Rule 9(h) in 1968.
4. Although no claim is made that the present study is comprehensive, it should be
noted that, on the whole, unification has fared remarkably well. A careful survey of the
cases since unification has not revealed any major problem areas other than those to
be treated in this Note. Major problems are to be expected primarily where traditional
admiralty practice differed greatly from civil practice, in such matters as the right to
jury trial, jurisdictional requirements, and remedial powers. Any problem areas not
covered in this Note would in all likelihood be found to consist of permutations of these
same basic elements.
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I. Principles of Rule Construction
Any attempt to decide whether certain practices are compatible with
the unified civil and admiralty procedure presupposes canons for con-
struing the rules by which that unification was accomplished. Some prin-
ciples of rule construction are thus indispensable. In interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has indicated that
courts should examine "the literal language [and] the intended effect
of the Rules" in order to discover "the purpose of the draftsmen or the
congressional understanding."5 Applying these principles to the 1966
unification yields the major premise of this Note: that, absent specific
provision to the contrary, procedure in admiralty suits should be the
same as that followed in civil actions generally. This premise may be
denominated the "presumption of uniform practice." The support for
this presumption is as follows: According to the "literal language" of
the rules, there is to be only "one form of action" "in all suits of a
civil nature, whether formerly cognizable as cases at law or in equity
or in admiralty."7 The "intended effect" of such language may be
found in a statement of the Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules:
[T]here [is a] need for a modern and comprehensive set of rules for
practice in admiralty cases. There is also a need to abolish the
formal distinction between civil actions and suits in admiralty, and
to provide for one form of civil action, just as the distinction be-
tween actions at law and suits in equity was abolished in 1938.s
Yet another factor supporting the presumption of uniform practice
is the very structure of the unified rules. The fact that in several areas
special admiralty procedures are carefully delineated supports the con-
clusion that elsewhere uniform procedures should be employed. In-
deed, unless procedures are to be largely the same in all civil actions,
a "unification" of rules is an exercise without meaning. Thus the stxuc-
ture of the rules themselves, as well as their express language and the
intent of the drafters, supports the presumption of uniform practice.
One method of exploring the strength and scope of this presump-
tion is to consider the factors that will serve to overcome it. There are
5. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
8. Letter of transmittal accompanying the proposed amendments to the rules, August
1965. Reproduced in 7A MooRE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE .11[2] at 156.
9. See note 3 supra.
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three: the Constitution, the Rules Enabling Act,10 and Rule 82.11
Should application of the presumption in a particular case conflict with
a constitutional right or duty, a court would be required to ignore the
presumption. The presumption is also limited by the terms of the En-
abling Act, the statute authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure for the federal judiciary. It provides in part that
"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right."' 2 Distinguishing between substantive and procedural rights is
frequently difficult, but the Supreme Court has announced a general
yardstick for measuring a rule against the terms of the Enabling Act.
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by sub-
stantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them.'13
The presumption of uniform practice engendered by the rules is thus
limited by the requirement that it affect only procedural matters. If its
application in an admiralty context would alter substantive rights, the
presumption must be disregarded.
The third factor limiting the application of the presumption of uni-
form practice is the provision of Rule 82 that "[t]hese rules shall not
be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts . ... "14 A potential difficulty in interpreting Rule 82
lies in the word "jurisdiction," which can be used in many different
senses. Its meaning in this context has, however, been settled by the
Supreme Court, which noted that the Advisory Committee
has treated Rule 82 as referring to . . . jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of the district courts as defined by the statutes .... 11
Obvious examples of such statutes are the three major grants of federal
jurisdiction: federal question, diversity, and admiralty.' 6 To the extent
that application of the presumption of uniform practice would alter
these or other jurisdictional grants, Rule 82 prohibits its use.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
11. The constitutional and Enabling Act restrictions are outlined in Hanna v. l'lumer,
380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Rule 82 is explained in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,
Miss., 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
13. Sibbach v. Wilson Co., 312 US. 1, 14 (1941).
14. FEn. R. Civ. P. 82.
15. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, Miss., 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (empha-
sis added).
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-33 (1970).
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In the remainder of this Note, the principles of rule interpretation
just outlined will be applied to three areas in which some courts, de-
spite unification, have perpetuated former admiralty practices without
specific authorization in the rules themselves. These areas are (1) ie
availability of equitable forms of relief, (2) joinder of claims, and (3)
third-party practice. Each situation will be examined to determine
whether the presumption of uniform practice applies to it, and, if so,
whether constitutional, jurisdictional, or substantive considerations re-
quire that the presumption be overridden. 17
II. Equitable Remedies
For more than seventy-five years prior to unification it had been re-
garded as settled that "[w]hile the court of admiralty exercises its juris-
diction upon equitable principles, it has not the characteristic powers of
a court of equity."18 Sixty years after it made this statement, the Su-
preme Court explained that its proper interpretation was that an ad-
miralty court "will not enforce an independent equitable claim merely
because it pertains to maritime property,""0 and that admiralty would
decide an equitable claim only if it were a "subsidiary or derivative
issue in a litigation clearly maritime."2 0 It is the contention of this
section that these maxims no longer limit the remedial power of a
federal district court in dealing with admiralty cases, and that unifica-
tion has made all remedies available to the court in cases properly
brought under the admiralty jurisdiction.
At least one commentator speculated that unification would have
such an effect.2 ' The limited case law since unification, however, indi-
17. Factors and considerations other than the three cited must )ield to the policy
favoring uniform practice. Examples of such factors are: (1) Tradition. Unification
represents a conscious choice to overrule history in most procedural matters. (2) Rule
ambiguity. The presumption of uniform practice requires that ambiguities be resolved
in favor of a single procedure. (3) Contrary policy considerations. Policy choices werc
consciously resolved by the Advisory Committee in favor of unifonnity, and these
choices were subsequently ratified by the Supreme Court and Congress. A district court
is not free to disregard these choices and depart from uniformity unless specifically
authorized to do so by the rules themselves.
18. The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599, 608 (1890).
19. Swift & Company Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S.
684, 690 (1950).
20. Id. at 691. The "subsidiary" equitable issue in Swift wsas whether there had been
a fraudulent transfer of a vessel in order to avoid the court's writ of foreign attachenut.
See FEn. R. Civ. P. B. The Court in Swift also described other situations qualifying under
the "subsidiary issue" test, including equitable claims raised as defenses, and an equitable
accounting that is necessary for "the complete adjustment of rights over which admiralty
has independent jurisdiction." 339 US. at 692.
21. "Under the plain language of new rules I and 18, all of civil procedure, in-
cluding the right to seek equitable remedies, becomes equally applicable to admiralty
and diversity or federal-question jurisdiction " Colby, Admirally Unification, 54
Gao. L.J. 1258, 1268 (1966).
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cates that old admiralty maxims are not so easily dislodged. One dis-
trict court questioned the continuing vitality of the maxim, but then
decided the case before it on other grounds.2 2 In the only other re-
ported case involving the rule, its validity was apparently not even
called into question before either the district court or the court of
appeals.2
3
The unified rules are silent with respect to the availability of reme-
dies, except for those provisions preserving traditional remedies pecul-
iar to maritime cases for post-unification suits brought under the ad-
miralty jurisdiction.2 4 The absence of any similar provision restricting
equitable remedies to suits based on non-maritime jurisdictional grants
may imply that such remedies are available in all civil actions. But any
such inference, as well as the applicability of the general presumption
of uniform practice,25 requires a showing that the availability of reme-
'dies is a matter of procedure. The Supreme Court, commenting on uni-
fication in a non-admiralty context, has held that "[u]nder the Rules
there is only one action-a 'civil action'-in which all claims may be
joined and all remedies are available.20 The availability of remedies
to the court must, of course, be carefully distinguished from the entitle-
ment to a particular remedy in a given case. The question of entitle-
22. Defendant also contends that this Court may not grant plaintiff the relief it
seeks [injunction] since an admiralty court has no jurisdiction to issue such at
equitable decree. . . . The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 1, Fed. Rules of Clv.
Proc., however, rendered the continuing effect of this long established doctrine of
admiralty unclear ....
Thyssen Steel Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Nay. Co., 274 F. Supp. 18, 20 n1.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
23. Compania de Navegacione Almirante S.A. Panama v. Certain 1'rocecds of Cargo,
288 F. Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal. 1967), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Beverly Hills National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania de Navegacione Almirante S.A. Panama, 437 F.2d 301
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 996 (1971).
In this case the owner of a vessel brought suit in admiralty against the vessel charterer
to recover charter hire, and against the charterer's creditor, a bank, to impose a con-
structive trust on funds then in the bank's possession which represented the charter
hire. The bank objected to joinder of the two claims on the ground that there was no
maritime relationship between the vessel owner and the bank, and, therefore, no
admiralty jurisdiction over the equitable claim to a constructive trust,
The district court held that the claim against the bank was "subsidiary" to that
against the charterer, and was thus within the doctrine of the Swift decision, see note
20 supra. The court of appeals disagreed. It held that the claim against the bank was
an entirely separate claim, and was not covered by Swift. But it was held proper for
the district court to decide the independent equitable claim, since it could be properly
joined with the claim against the charterer, for either of two reasons: (1) Diversity
jurisdiction existed over the claim against the bank, though it had not been pleaded;
or (2) The claims, though separate, were closely enough related to justify their joinder
by pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hurts
v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). For another application of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction as related to maritime law, see Romero v. International Terminal Oper-
ating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
24. See FED. R. Clv. P. A-F.
25. See p. 1155 supra.
26. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970) (emphasis added).
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ment pertains to the substantive law involved and the facts of the mat-
ter before the court. It is unaffected by unification," since the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure can only alter matters of procedure. But if, as
the Court indicates, the rules have made all civil remedies available in
all "civil actions," then the Court must have concluded that the avail-
ability of remedies in civil actions is a matter of procedure.28 That be-
ing so, the presumption of uniform practice applies. But before con-
cluding that unification has therefore compelled the availability of
equitable remedies in admiralty suits, the application of the presump-
tion must be examined to insure that it does not infringe upon consti-
tutional requirements, alter subject matter jurisdiction, or affect sub-
stantive rights.
29
The only apparent constitutional objection to the availability of
equitable remedies might be that such remedies are not within the "ad.
miralty and maritime jurisdiction" authorized by Article III of the
Constitution.3" Since, however, Rule 82 forbids interpretations of the
rules which would alter the courts' subject matter jurisdiction, one
need not reach the constitutional question in order to invalidate a rule
interpretation on jurisdictional grounds. Conversely, an interpretation
that is unobjectionable under Rule 82 is also necessarily permissible
under Article III.
The cases establishing the maxim that equitable remedies are un-
available in admiralty suits appear to rest on this jurisdictional objec-
tion. Yet, on closer examination, it becomes clear that it was not the
request for equitable remedies which placed those cases beyond the ju-
risdiction of the court but rather the substantive facts underlying tile
claims themselves. 31 In essence, these cases denied equitable relief be-
27. Cf. 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE 2.02[1], on the effect of the unification of law
and equity on the availability of remedies.
28. The exclusively procedural nature of remedy availability is supported by the
language of the Supreme Court in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 US. 109
(1924). The plaintiff in that case sought from a New York state court the specific per-
formance of an arbitration clause in a maritime agreement. In holding that the state
court could grant such relief, Justice Brandeis disposed of the contention that specific
performance of the clause could not be had in state court because such relief was
unavailable from a court of admiralty. It was "merely because that court lacks the
power to grant equitable relief" that admiralty would not order specific performance
of such an agreement. "The reluctance of the admiralty court to lend full aid goes.
however, merely to the remedy. The substantive right created by an agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration is recognized as a perfect obligation." Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
29. See p. 1156 supra.
30. "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction ...." U.S. Coxsr. art. III, § 2.
31. One author, writing in 1969, concluded that unification had not altered the
equity power doctrine because that doctrine was probably a matter of jurisdiction. Zobel,
Admiralty Jurisdiction, Unification and the American Law Institute, 6 &%A, DiEGo L.
Rv. 375, 382-95 (1969). The argument in the text is that the doctrine is not itself
jurisdictional, although it frequently appears in the company of other matters which are.
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cause they were non-maritime in nature; the court sitting in admiralty
did not have jurisdiction to grant any remedy at all-equitable or mari-
time.
Even The Eclipse,3 2 the Supreme Court case invariably cited for the
proposition that admiralty courts do not grant equitable remedies,03
does not indicate that the jurisdictional question goes to the remedy
per se. In that case, an owner of half interest in a vessel joined with
creditors who were beneficial owners to bring an action to secure pos-
session of the vessel from the owner of the other half interest, who was
also master of the vessel. A third party intervened, seeking possession
through specific performance of a contract of sale, which, however, had
not been signed by the master, although the master had earlier joined
in establishing the committee which had negotiated the sale. The Court
affirmed possession by the master because (1) the committee had ex-
ceeded the scope of its authority in the terms of the sale it arranged,
and therefore legal title remained in the master and the other half
owner; and (2) a master who is owner of a half interest cannot be re-
moved by the other half owner.
The Court then commented on the claim of the intervenors. If they
intended to "enforce an alleged contract of sale,"3 4 "they should have
resorted to a different tribunal."3 Admiralty jurisdiction
depends, in cases of contract, upon the nature of the contract, and
is limited to contracts, claims and services purely maritime, and
touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navi-
gation .... There was nothing maritime about the claims of the
intervenors, and the intervention was properly dismissed for want
of jurisdiction over the subject matter.30
The objectionable aspect of the intervenors' claim was not that specific
performance was sought, but that a contract of sale is not a maritime
contract, even when it involves a sea-going vessel.37 And while the
Court lists a number of equitable remedies which it suggests cannot be
32. 135 U.S. 599 (1890).
33. See, e.g., Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954); Schoenamsgruber v.
Hamburg American Line, 294 U.S. 454 (1935); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium,
293 U.S. 21 (1934); New York Dock Co. v. The Poznan, 274 U.S. 117 (1927); Armour &
Co. v. Fort Morgan S.S. Co., 270 U.S. 253 (1926); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U.S. 109 (1924); North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Brothers Marine Ry., 249 U.S. 119
(1919); The J.E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1893).
34. 135 U.S. at 608.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Accord, that contracts of sale are not maritime, The Ada, 250 F. 191 (2d Cir.
1918); 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAMICE .245[2] at 2974; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, TIlE
LAw oF ADMIRALTY 25 (1957).
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granted by an admiralty court,38 an examination of the cases cited by
the Court in each instance reveals that they rested not on a jurisdic-
tional barrier to remedies, but on a determination that the underlying
facts, like the contract of sale in the Eclipse, were not maritime in
nature. These cases concern such matters as partnership agreements
involving vessel operations,3 9 ship mortges, 40 agreements to make a
maritime contract,41 and agency agreements between owners and ship
agents.4 2 Although suits arising from such relationships often include
demands for equitable remedies,43 admiralty declined to hear them not
because of the character of the relief sought, but due to a lack of juris-
diction over the facts underlying the claims. 4 4 The distinction between
38. Admiralty was said to be unable to "entertain a bill or libel for specific per-
formance, or to correct a mistake . . . declare or enforce a trust or an equitable title ...
exercise jurisdiction in matters of account merely . . . [or] decree the sale of a ship for
an unpaid mortgage, or declare her to be the property of the mortgagee and direct
possession of her to be given to them." 135 U.S. at 608.
39. Ward v. Thompson, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 330 (1859); Kellum v. Emerson. 14 F. Cas.
263 (No. 7669) (C.C.D. Mass. 1854); The Ocean Belie, 18 F. Cas. 524 (No. 10,402) (S.D.N.Y.
1872).
40. Bogart v. The John Jay; 58 US. (17 How.) 399 (1854).
41. Andrews v. Essex Fire & Marine Ins. Co., I F. Cas. 885 (No. 374) (C.C.D. Mass.
1822).
42. Mintum v. Maynard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854).
The Court cited two other cases, one of which declined to entertain a claim of equi-
table title because of a substantive rule that the right in question depended on legal
title only, The Amelia, 23 F. 406 (C.C..D.N.Y. 1877), see p. 1163 infra. The remaining
case involved an enormously complicated set of transactions, part of which were non-
maritime. The Court ruled that admiralty should not hear the case because the non-mari-
time elements were so intertwined with the maritime elements, and because the procedures
of a court of equity were better suited to sorting out the complications. Grant v. Poillon,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 162 (1857). Cf. the cases discussed in note 43 infra.
43. There are indications in some of the early cases that admiralty procedures were
regarded as inadequate satisfactorily to resolve complex matters or to administer unique
remedies. See, e.g., Andrews v. Essex Ins. Co., I F. Cas. 885, 888 (No. 374) (C.C.D. Mass.
1822):
The authority over this subject [reformation of contract] is generally confided, and
most conveniently, to courts of equity. The rules of evidence and the modes of
relief in these courts are admirably adapted to cases of this nature.
See also Kellum v. Emerson, 14 F. Cas. 263, 265 (No. 7669) (C.C.D. Mass. 1854):
Though a court of admiralty is not incompetent to take an account, it must cer-
tainly be admitted that its modes of proceeding have not been framed with any
special reference to doing so, and that complicated accounts between part owners
of vessels, and the rights of the parties dependent on them, can hardly be worked
out satisfactorily in this jurisdiction.
These procedural weaknesses may have been one reason why certain relationships
that spawn complicated lawsuits were excluded from admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction
and referred to equity, which had a more sophisticated procedure. It such is the case,
there is a certain irony to the present situation. For unification has made cquit)s
sophisticated procedures available under the admiralty jurisdiction, but the cases re-
quiring sophisticated procedures are excluded by jurisdictional rules forged tinder the
premise of inadequate admiralty procedures.
44. A separate question is whether and how admiralty's jurisdictional boundaries
might be expanded to include the relationships discussed in the text. Both the Supreme
Court and Congress have wrought practical expansions of the admiralty jurisdiction.
See, e.g., The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (deciding that admiralty
jurisdiction extends to navigable inland waterways, not just tidewaters). Cf. Detroit
Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934) (affirming congressional extension
of admiralty jurisdiction to certain ship mortgages). Thus, two avenues of change are
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the request for equitable relief and the substantive facts underlying the
claim is thus of signal importance, for it frees the granting of equitable
remedies in admiralty cases from jurisdictional objection. Where the
facts underlying a claim are clearly maritime and within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of admiralty, The Eclipse and its progeny raise
no bar to the granting of equitable relief.45 Granting equitable reme-
possible: judicial pronouncement of the newly-discovered content of admiralty juris.
iction and legislation to the same effect which is subsequently sustained by the Court.
The standard of review of congressional extensions of admiralty jurisdiction is of con.
siderable importance in assessing the practicality of the legislative approach to juris.
dictional change. That ultimate control is exercised over such legislation by tile Court
was announced in early cases which suggested that the proper scope of admiralty juris.
diction would be determined by reference to our own legal history and to foreign
practice. See, e.g., The St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 522, 527 (1862); The Lottawanna,
88 U.S. (21 Wall) 558, 575-77 (1875). In a more thorough discussion of the subject, tile
Detroit Trust case, supra, measured the legislative extension of jurisdiction against "a
proper conception of maritime concerns," 293 U.S. at 48, and the "general maritie
law" as illuminated by the practice of England and "other European States." Id. at 49.
The Court agreed that preferred ship mortgages came within the scope of admiralty
jurisdiction, so defined, commenting that
The authority of Congress to enact legislation of this nature was not limited by
previous decisions as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction. We have had
abundant reason to realize that our experience and new conditions give rise to
new conceptions of maritime concerns. These may require that former criteria of
jurisdiction be abandoned ....
Id. at 52.
An alternate approach is illustrated by United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201
F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953), which upheld the validity of the Admiralty Extension Act of
1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). That Act extended admiralty jurisdiction to torts in which
a vessel causes damage ashore. The court said that while the "exercise of the admiralty
jurisdiction" in this country had not included such torts, they were within a reasonable"'concept of maritime affairs" and thus were "within 'the admiralty and maritime jurls-
diction as known and understood in the United States when the Constitution was
adopted.'" Id. at 615.
On either theory, it seems likely that the new perspective provided by unification
would render the Court receptive to congressional action bringing the relationships
discussed in the text within the admiralty jurisdiction. Congress currently has an 11n.
common opportunity to do just that. A bill currently before the Senate Judiciary
Committee includes several sections redefining the admiralty jurisdiction based on the
proposals of the American Law Institute. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1316-19 (1971).
Cf. ALL, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTs,
34-37, 225-54 (1969). The ALI recommendations have been faulted for their tinidity,
see Zobel, supra note 31, at 395-411. Although the proposed legislation does not rigidly
adhere to the ALI recommendations, its approach is that of repairing selected jurls.
dictional problems on an ad hoc basis. A bolder approach, involving a1 sweeping re-
definition of admiralty jurisdiction, could rationalize an area of law that presently
suffers from a surfeit of doctrinal patchwork. See, e.g., Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction:
Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 259 (1950).
Admittedly, such a reformulation of the jurisdiction would be exceedingly difficult
to reduce to statutory language. Nevertheless, one hopes that Congress will make a
serious attempt to do so rather than adopting the current approach of S. 1876. No
attempt will be made here to prescribe a specific statutory formula, for tile question
involves considerations far beyond the scope of this Note.
45. It is a fair question whether many situations presently within the admiralty
jurisdiction could support claims for equitable relief. Even if jurisdictional considera.
tions were to keep the bulk of potential equitable claims out of admiralty, see note 43
supra, abolishing the maxim might be desirable merely for the sake of greater clarity
and consistency in judicial treatment of these matters.
However, situations do exist in which there are no jurisdictional barriers to a request
for equitable relief. An example is the issuance of an injunction. Support for the
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dies in such situations contravenes neither constitutional nor Rule
82 jurisdictional limitations.
The remaining factor to be considered is whether the availability
of equitable remedies in admiralty suits would alter substantive rights.
No case has been found which supports the maxim on such grounds.
It would plainly be an alteration of substantive rights to grait an
equitable remedy where only non-equitable relief such as damages
would be appropriate given the facts of the underlying maritime claim.
But the mere availability of equitable remedies in admiralty cases, a
matter which the Supreme Court has indicated is purely procedural,4
does not alter substantive rights.
4
T
The presumption of uniform practice, therefore, necessitates the
conclusion that unification has rendered equitable remedies available
in admiralty cases.48 The contrary maxim, while purporting to rest
on jurisdictional limitations, has in fact no such basis and seems to
have been a product of imprecise dicta. In light of unification, it must
now be discarded.
49
proposition that admiralty does not issue injunctions is singularly slim. The only
authority cited by the Supreme Court in Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg American Line,
294 U.S. 454 (1935), the case which established the doctrine, is Paterson v. Dakin, 31
F. 682 (S.D. Ala. 1887), which treats the question in a single sentence: "On the hearing
of the exceptions in this case I held that the court had no power to grant the injunc-
tion prayed for .... " Id. at 683. Schoenamsgruber itself held only that since admiralty
courts "do not issue injunctions," 294 U.S. at 458, an order of an admiralty court is not
appealable as an interlocutory injunction. The reason given for the conclusion that
admiralty courts do not issue injunctions is that "they do not have general equitable
jurisdiction." Id. at 457. But such remedial jurisdiction has nothing to do with the
subject-matter jurisdiction that cannot be altered by rule interpretation.
46. See pp. 1158-59 supra.
47. In Morrison, The Remedial Powers of Admiraly, 43 YALE L.J. 1 (1933), it was
concluded that the restrictive rule was entirely a matter of substantive law. Tile author
was primarily concerned to show that the doctrine was not jurisdictional, and did not
inquire into the possibility that it might be procedural, rather than substantive.
48. Chief Judge Brown of the 5th Circuit agrees about the effect of unification on
the availability of equitable remedies.
The melding of the civil with the admiralty does more than obliterate the cherished
hoary title of proctor. It invests the Judge with all of the statutory powers, whether
their genesis be formerly at law, in equity, or in admiralty.
Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 1969).
As a result, in
this day and time the disposition will be to let the Chancellor stride the quarterdeck
to transport into the Admiralty all of the Court's equity powers.
Id.
Judge Brown has long campaigned for equitable powers in admiralty. See Compania
Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.
1962) and Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1901).
49. That district courts should discard the maxim on their own is not to say that
a clarification from the Supreme Court or Congress would not be in order. The equitable
remedies doctrine is of formidable complexity, and possesses such a strong jurisdictional
aura that its non-jurisdictional components may be perceived only with difficult).
Again, there is a legislative opportunity at hand. Short of redefining admiralty juris-
diction so as to include all the conceivably maritime relationships now excluded, see
note 44 supra, it would be of real service to have dearly defined the effect of unification
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III. Joinder
In the area of permissive joinder of parties, the intent of the uni.
fied rules appears to be clear. Rule 20(a) was amended explicitly to
permit the joinder of "any vessel, cargo or other property subject to
admiralty process in rem" with real persons as defendants in a single
action. Such joinder is permissible if as to all defendants so joined
"there [be] asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alterna-
tive, any relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any ques-
tion of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action."50
Problems in this connection have arisen where admiralty claims
brought in rem against a vessel are joined with claims brought against
real persons, where the latter claims have a jurisdictional basis other
than admiralty and one that entitles the plaintiff to a jury trial. At
least one court has held that the presence of a jury trial demand for
the in personam claims bars the joinder of maritime property in rem
as the object of the admiralty claims.rl In what follows it will be
argued that: (1) demand for a jury trial of the in personam claims
does not bar the joinder of maritime property in rem as a party de-
fendant, and (2) when such joinder is made the jury should resolve
the issues in all of the joined claims, including those against the
maritime property.
The problem described above has presented itself most frequently
in seamen's personal injury cases. The injured seaman has three rights
of recovery. 2 The most ancient is that of maintenance and cure,
which is the right to receive from the owner of the vessel compensa-
tion for medical care and subsistence during convalescence if the
seaman is injured or becomes ill "when subject to the call of duty."0 3
It is not necessary that the injury or illness be work-related.64 The
seaman's second right is to recover damages against the owner if he
is injured because of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Neither un-
on the availability of equitable remedies for claims admittedly within the admiralty
jurisdiction. The Senate bill, see note 44 supra, might be worded as follows:
§ 1316(c)
The district courts of the United States, when hearing suits under the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, shall be empowered to order all appropriate remedies,
whether formerly characterized as legal, equitable or maritime.
50. Fn. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
51. Fernandes v. United Fruit Co., 303 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1969). See p. 1168 infra.
52. A detailed discussion of the remedies available to the injured seaman is contained
in G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, supra note 37, at 248-332.
53. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 529 (1938).
54. See G. GiLMoRE & C. BLAcK, supra note 37, at 257-61.
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seaworthiness nor maintenance and cure claims require a showing of
negligence on the part of the vessel owner; recovery is available re-
gardless of fault.53 The third cause of action for personal injury arises
under the Jones Act50 which incorporates the Federal Employers'
Liability Act57 by reference, and provides for recovery against the
employer upon a showing of negligence. The seaman has the option
of bringing suit under the Jones Act either "in admiralty," in which
case trial is to the court; or "at law," with a right to trial by jury.38
The first two causes of action, maintenance and cure and unsea-
worthiness, as with most maritime causes of action, may be maintained
at law under the "saving clause"59 in state court or, upon a showing
of diversity of citizenship in federal court.00 The attraction of suing
"at law" is, of course, the availability of a jury trial.0 ' Alternatively,
these actions may be brought under the aidmiralty jurisdiction either
in personam, against the owner of the vessel, or in rem, against the
vessel itself. In neither case is a jury trial available.02 An in rem
suit personifies the vessel and names it as a party defendant. The in
rem procedure provides security for the plaintiff, for the court can
order that the vessel be sold to satisfy a judgment. By contrast, a suit
under the Jones Act, even though brought in admiralty, cannot be
in rem, since the Act has been construed to create only in personam
liability.63
It is customary for a seaman to assert all three grounds of recovery
in a single action. This practice raises questions about the proper
scope of the jury right when the seaman elects to pursue his Jones
Act remedy at law with trial by jury, but cannot establish diversity
jurisdiction so as to bring his other two claims at law and thereby
obtain as of right a jury trial of these claims as well. A bifurcated
55. Id. at -953-54.
56. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
57. 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1970).
58. A suit "at law" under the Jones Act may be maintained in state or federal court.
In either case, the plaintiff must comply with venue requirements in the Act which
do not apply when the action is brought "in admiralty." Further, since a Jones Act suit
"at law" in federal court comes within the general "federal question" jurisdictional
grant, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). it is necessary to satisfy the $10,000 "amount in contro.
versy" requirement. W. BAPRoN & A. HOL'IzOFF, FsEDEL P., cricE AND PROCEntRE § 32
at 180-81 (Wright ed. 1960).
59. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) (emphasis added).
60. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLAbc, supra note 37, at 33-35.
61. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
62. FED. P. Civ. P. 38(e).
63. Plamals v. S.S. Pinar del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
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trial is usually feasible so far as the maintenance and cure claim is
concerned because the issues relevant to that claim are largely sepa-
rable from those involved in the other two actions.04 Problems are
involved, however, in any attempt to try the Jones Act claim to a
jury and the unseaworthiness claim to the court since the issues in-
volved in the two claims have large areas of overlap. The two claims
are really alternate theories for a single recovery,05 and having two
fact-finders in the case makes it difficult to arrive at a single appro-
priate amount of recovery.00
In Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co.,67 the Supreme Court un-
dertook to resolve differences among the lower federal courts relating
to the mode of trial in seamen's personal injury cases. The Court
observed that
[r]equiring a seaman to split up his lawsuit, submitting part of
it to a jury and part to a judge, unduly complicates and confuses
a trial, creates difficulties in applying doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, and can easily result in too much or too
little recovery.08
Thus, both judicial economy and fairness are served by having a
single fact-finder decide all three claims. And since the plaintiff was
entitled to a jury trial of his Jones Act claim, the Court in Fitzgerald
held that the single fact-finder must be a jury. No constitutional ob-
jection could be made to a jury trial of the admiralty claims,09 for,
64. The Second Circuit, in affirming a bifurcated trial in the Fitzgerald case, noted
that the issues in maintenance and cure are separable from those in the other claims.
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 306 F.2d 461, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1962).
65. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 18 (1963).
66. See quote accompanying note 68 this page.
67. 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
68. Id. at 18-19.
69. These claims were not strictly in admiralty. The plaintiff asserted them as
"pendent" to his Jones Act claim at law. The possibility of using the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction in the seamen's personal injury context was suggested by the Supreme Court
in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380.81 (1959). In
Romero, the Court explicitly reserved decision on whether jury trial was available for
the pendent claims. Fitzgerald might seem, then, to be the answer to that reserved
question.
At least two factors indicate, however, that the holding was intended to embrace
claims for maintenance and cure and for unseaworthiness regardless of how they were
joined to the Jones Act claim. First, the Court mentions Romero only once, in a foot-
note to a different aspect of that opinion. 374 U.S. at 17 n.3. Second, the Court states
quite plainly that its "responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty
law," id. at 20, justifies its decision that
[o]nly one trier of fact should be used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit
to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical de-
velopments.
Id. at 21. A Court which could conceptually unify the three seamen's actions in this
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while this Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not
require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment
nor any other provision of the Constitution forbids them. 0
Fitzgerald involved unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure
claims brought in personam against the shipowner. The jury trial
problem raised in connection with the joinder of those claims with
the Jones Act claim at law was resolved by permitting joinder and
providing for jury trial of all three claims. It remains to be considered
whether the reasoning of the Court is equally applicable to such a
situation when the unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims
are brought in rem against the vessel. At least one court has indi-
cated that the proper disposition of such a case is to preclude joinder
altogether.7 1 Yet Rule 20(a), in providing that maritime property
may be joined as a defendant, does not indicate that any special con-
ditions are necessary for such joinder. In the absence of any explicit
distinction between joinder of maritime property as against other
potential defendants, the presumption of uniform practice appears to
compel the conclusion that a vessel is as susceptible of joinder as its
owner, and that both cases fall under the Fitzgerald rule permitting
joinder and providing a jury trial of all three related claims. However,
it is necessary to show that giving effect to this presumption will not
violate constitutional requirements, alter jurisdiction, or affect sub-
stantive rights.72
The result suggested here was approved in Haskins v. Point Towing
Co.7" The district court had held that the plaintiff's Jones Act claim
had to be brought in admiralty because the venue requirement for
proceeding at law had not been met.74 All of the claims, therefore,
were tried to the court. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
the venue requirement had been satisfied. The court went on to
discuss the proper handling of the case on remand, since the Jones
Act claim was joined with the traditional claims for maintenance and
cure and unseaworthiness. The holding of the Fitzgerald case was
not directly applicable because the claims were asserted both in per-
fashion could hardly be suspected of restricting its meaning to cases using thc procedural
technicality of pendent jurisdiction. Rather the Court's holding would seem to apply
especially when the maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness claims arc brought
directly in admiralty.
70. 374 US. at 20.
71. Fernandes v. United Fruit Co., 303 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1969). Sec p. 1168 infra.
72. See p. 1156 supra.
73. 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968).
74. See note 58 supra.
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sonam and in rem. But the court of appeals indicated that this addi-
tional factor did not require departure from the Fitzgerald rule. The
court could see no reason to "compel [the plaintiff] to lose the ad-
vantages which inhere in the characteristic admiralty claims, such as
in rem process" as "the price for a jury trial."7"
Nevertheless, the following year a district court did make forfeiture
of in rem process the price of a jury trial.70 In Fernandes v. United
Fruit Co.,7 a seaman joined all three customary claims, asserting all
of them both in personam and in rem, and demanding a jury trial
for them in their character as in personam claims against the em-
ployer. The district court held that the plaintiff was required to
choose between having a jury trial of the in personam claims and
proceeding in rem. In view of plaintiff's subsequent insistence upon
his jury demand, the court dismissed the in rem counts.78 This case
may appear to parallel Fitzgerald and to differ from the situation
under consideration, since in Fernandes plaintiff did not demand a
jury trial of the claims in their in rem character. However, the dif-
ference is merely a matter of form. The issues involved in the claims
are precisely the same, whether asserted in personam or in rein. Thus,
a demand for a jury trial of the claims in their in personam character
is in effect also a demand for jury trial of the claims in rem.
The objections of the Fernandes court to joinder of the in rem
claims were not explicitly constitutional. But implicit in the court's
requirement that the plaintiff forego either the in rem device or his
jury trial demand is the notion that there may never be a jury trial
of an in rem claim. This precise point has not been treated by the
Supreme Court, but the Fitzgerald case provides an analogy that is
very close indeed. The Fernandes court acknowledged that Fitzgerald
would require a jury trial of the admiralty claims if they were brought
in personam, but assumed that to apply the Fitzgerald reasoning to
in rem claims would be intolerable.79
An examination of Fitzgerald discloses no reason for restricting its
holding to in personam claims. The language of the opinion indicates
no such restriction. The Court found that no constitutional provision
forbade jury trial in "admiralty cases,"80 which plainly embraces in
75. 395 F.2d at 741.
76. This fulfills the prediction of one commentator that joinder of admiralty clahng
under Rule 20 would meet jury trial objections. Cohn, The Seamless Web: Gitil.Ad.
miralty Unification, 1967 A.B.A. SEar. INs., NEG. & CoMr. L. 228, 230.
77. 303 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1969).
78. 303 F. Supp. at 683.
79. Id. at 682-83.
80. 374 U.S. at 20.
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rem as well as in personam actions; it can hardly be supposed that
the Court forgot about in rem actions when it spoke of "admiralty
cases," since the in rem action is the most distinctive characteristic
of admiralty jurisdiction.8' A jury is no less competent to decide in
rem claims than claims brought in personam, for the issues to be
decided are identical. The interest in judicial economy and fairness
which lay at the heart of the Fitzgerald opinion -' seems equally strong
whether the joined claims are brought in rem or in personam. From
the constitutional perspective, there appears to be no reason not to
allow jury trial of in rem claims. This constitutional bar having been
removed, it can no longer serve to thwart tie free joinder of in rem
admiralty claims with other claims brought at law.
While the constitutional objection to joinder is only implicit in the
Fernandes opinion, the court makes an explicit argument that there
is a substantive law requirement that the plaintiff elect between pro-
ceeding in rem and having a jury trial. The argument advanced by
the court relies on an interpretation of Platnals v. S.S. Pinar del Rio,83
one of the early cases construing the Jones Act. According to the
Fernandes reading, Plamals held that
[sleamen may invoke, at their election, (a) the relief accorded
by the traditional admiralty rules in rent against the ship, or (b)
that provided by the Jones Act with the right of jury trial against
the employer, but not both.8
4
But an examination of the Plamals opinion reveals that an election
between proceeding in rem and having a jury trial was not the choice
the Plamals Court had in mind. In that case a foreign seaman sought
to recover under the Jones Act. Possibly because his employer was
not subject to the court's in personam process, the seaman libelled
the vessel and proceeded in rem. The Court held that a suit under
the Jones Act could not be brought in rem, and ordered dismissal of
plaintiff's suit.s3 Having so held, the Supreme Court added the fol-
lowing language:
81. Indeed, only in admiralty may an in rem proceeding against a vessel be maintained.
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 US. (4 Wall.)
555 (1867). At least one commentator doubted the wisdon of procedural unification
because of a fear that the in rem action, which he regarded as the very heart of admiralty.
would face the danger of doctrinal erosion. Wiswall, Admiralty: Procedural Unification
in Retrospect and Prospect, 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 36, 46 (1968).
82. See p. 1166 supra.
83. 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
84. 303 F. Supp. at 682.
85. 277 US. at 155-56.
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Seamen may invoke, at their election, the relief accorded by the
old rules against the ship, or that provided by the new against
the employer. But they may not have the benefit of both.80
The Fernandes court read this language as imposing a procedural
choice: in rem process or jury trial. But it is apparent that its concern
with jury trial is a misreading of the Plamals opinion. Nowhere in
that opinion is jury trial even mentioned. The plaintiff did not seek,
indeed could not have sought, a jury trial, for the statute grants a
jury trial only if the Jones Act claim is brought at law. In Plamals
the plaintiff sued in admiralty 7
The choice required by Plamals was substantive, not, as interpreted
by Fernandes, procedural. 8 The old admiralty rules had always al-
lowed a plaintiff to proceed both against the ship owner (who was
with few exceptions also the employer of the seamen manning the
vessel) and against the vessel itself,89 so the Jones Act did not create
a new form of relief by allowing the employer to be sued. What was
new was the availability of a recovery against the employer for negli-
gence. Traditional maritime substantive remedies-Plamal's "old rules"
-recognized recovery for maintenance and cure and for unseaworthi-
ness, but not for negligence. The Plamals Court thus seems to have
been suggesting that a seaman must choose between using the tradi-
tional maritime theories of recovery, under which a suit may be main-
86. Id. at 156-57.
87. The statutory language that a seaman could, "at his election, maintain an action
for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury," 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), had raised
some question whether a Jones Act suit could be brought in admiralty. In Pananla R.R.
v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), it was held that a suit could be so brought.
88. The reasoning of Fernandes was closely followed the next year in Johnson v.
Venezuelan Line Steamship Co., 314 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. La. 1970). In Johnson, the
widow of a longshoreman sued under the Louisiana wrongful death statute alleging
the unseaworthiness of the vessel on which her husband was killed. Site filed separate
suits in federal district court: one in rem against the vessel, and the other under diversity
jurisdiction against the owner. She demanded a jury trial of the action against the
owner. The owner moved to consolidate the actions for trial and to strike the jury
demand. The court held that plaintiff was required to choose between having a jury
trial of the diversity claim against the owner and proceeding in rent against the ship,
To reach that result, the court took a circuitous route through the Jones Act cases,
including Planials, discovering the same "election" rule that Fernandes had fottd.
Though in Johnson the claim at law was itself an unseaworthiness claim brought it
federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the court found the Jones Act election rule
to be applicable.
Here the claim does not arise under the Jones Act, and we do not have the statutory
election rule. But the rationale of the Jones Act cases is applicable.
Id. at 1407.
The court did not explain why any rules based on Jones Act construction should apply
when the Jones Act is not involved. But even so, as has been suggested, there is in fact
no Jones Act rule requiring an election between in rem proceedings and a jury trial.
Plaintiff should have been allowed both.
89. See G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, supra note 37, at 510-12.
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tained either in personam or in rem; and using the new Jones Act
negligence theory of recovery, which the Court held, as a matter of
statutory construction, could be brought only in personam against
the employer.90 This reading of the Plainals opinion is reinforced by
the fact that the Court spelled out a similar choice the very next
year.2 ' For some time after the Plamals decision courts required a
seaman to choose, either before proceeding to trial or before the case
was submitted to the jury, whether to rely on the Jones Act or on
unseaworthiness for recovery. That election, which was never required
by a Supreme Court holding, has been discontinued. Plaintiffs now
go to the jury on both theories, and recovery is granted if justified
under either.9
2
The Fernandes court was therefore mistaken in its conclusion that
there exists a substantive law requirement that the plaintiff elect
between proceeding in rem and having a jury trial. The two are in
no way incompatible, so that the existence of a jury trial demand for
a claim brought at law is no bar to the joinder of that claim with in
rem claims "arising out of the same transaction."93
The third possible objection to free joinder of civil and admiralty
claims is that it would alter the court's subject matter jurisdiction,
contrary to Rule 82. But that rule is no bar to joinder of these per-
90. Thorough analysis of the decision in Plainals requires that one %etuure into a
part of the trackless swamp of Jones Act history and construction. See generally G.
GiMoRE : C. BLACK, supra note 37, at 279-89.
In The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903), the Supreme Court outlined in four proposi-
tions the rights of recovery belonging to injured seamen. Propositions (1) and (2), re-
spectively, recognized rights of recovery for maintenance and cure and for unseaworthi-
ness. Propositions (3) and (4) in conjunction closed off negligence as a ground of recover.
Proposition (3) announced that all crew members, with the possible exception of the
master, were fellow-servants. Hence, a seaman could not recover if another crew mcmber
negligently injured him. Nor could he recover for injuries suffered while obeying a
negligent order issued by anyone other than the master. Proposition (.1) provided "[t]hat
the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the master, or
any member of the crew ... .'
The differences between these propositions were to be of crucial importance. In 1915,
Congress enacted a statute apparently aimed at overruling proposition (3). It provided
that "in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on board vessel or in
its service seamen having command shall not be held to be fellow.servants with those
under their authority." 38 Stat. 1164 (1915). Subsequently, in Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918), a seaman brought suit for injury caused by obe)ing an
officer's negligent order, on the theory that the 1915 statute removed the bar to rccove.l'.
But the Supreme Court held that proposition (4) of the Osceola determined that negli-
gence was not recognized in general maritime law as a ground of recovery for seamen's
injuries. Chelentis' action was dismissed.
Responding to the Chelentis decision, Congress created a right of recovery for
negligence by passing the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The
technique used was incorporation by reference of the provisions of the Federal Emplo)ers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
91. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
92. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BL csK, supra note 37, at 279-96.
93. FED. R. Cry. P. 20(a).
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sonal injury claims since all three claims are independently within
the jurisdiction of the district court.
Given the clarity of the language in the applicable rule and the
absence of any constitutional, jurisdictional, or substantive law ob-
jections, the achievement of unification in the matter of joinder re-
quires only that courts apply Rule 20(a) as written.9 1
IV. Third-Party Practice
Third-party practice is a device which permits a defendant to bring
into a lawsuit another party who may be liable for the damages al-
leged by the plaintiff. In the United States it was first used in ad-
miralty, under the name "impleader." But since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, it has been available in
all federal civil actions. The issue in this section is whether the juris-
dictional requirements of third-party practice peculiar to the former
admiralty procedure survive under the unified rules.
Prior to the 1966 unification, there were a number of differences
between third-party practice under the civil rules and impleader in
admiralty. In admiralty, a defendant"a could implead a third party
on either of two grounds: (1) that he might be liable to the defendant
by way of "remedy over, contribution or otherwise"10 (an "indem-
nity" claim) or (2) that he might be liable directly to the plaintiff
(a "substitute-defendant" claim). In the latter case, the plaintiff was
94. In the Senate bill to define federal and state jurisdiction, S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., see note 44 supra, section 1319 provides that, with certain exceptions, "any [ad.
miralty] claim in personam limited to money damages for personal injuries or death
shall be tried by jury if any party demands it." Such a rule would simplify mattets
greatly, sending to blessed oblivion the tortured doctrines used to justify jury trials fit
the past. But, at the same time, there may be a danger of a negative implication being
read into the language to the effect that in rem actions for personal inljury may not
have a jury trial.
This danger is made more likely by the fact that the language of the bill is identical
to that proposed in ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIGrON BETWEEN SrATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 37 (1969) [ALl, STUDY], which differs from that used in an earlier ALl
draft: "[T]rial of ...any claim arising out of personal injuries or death in which the
relief sought is limited to money damages shall be by jury if any party demands It."
ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN SrArE AND FEDERAL COURS 22
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968) [ALl, SrUDY (Tentative Draft)].
The ALl commentary does not explain why the "in personan" qualification was added
to the final draft. That commentary merely adds the words "in personam" to a paragraph
from the earlier commentary which announced that the "section makes a deliberate
legislative judgment." Compare ALl, STUDY at 253 with ALI, StUDY (Tentative Draft)
at 163. Since, as argued in the text, there is no reason for distinguishing between In
personam and in rem claims in the matter of jury trial, section 1319 should be made
applicable to all personal injury suits by deleting the words "in personamn."
95. Prior to unification the terminology used in designating parties and pleadings
in admiralty differed from that used in the civil rules. For example, instead of plaintiffs
and defendants, admiralty had libellants and respondents. Unification made the civil
terminology applicable to admiralty. The new terminology is used in the text even In
discussing pre-unification practice to avoid confusion.
96. Former Admiralty Rule 56. See note 102 infra.
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compelled to proceed against the third party as though he had been
originally joined as a defendant. In contrast, third-party practice
under the civil rules provided ofly for the assertion of indemnity
claims.9
7
Another difference between admiralty and civil third-party practice
was that the former required independent admiralty jurisdiction over
the third-party claim. In most cases this requirement is not unduly
burdensome; admiralty jurisdiction is shown by the maritime nature
of the facts underlying a claim. Hence a third-party claim, growing
out of a primary claim within the admiralty jurisdiction, would itself
involve those underlying facts, and so would usually be within that
same jurisdiction. Thus, requiring independent admiralty jurisdiction
over third-party claims under Rule 56 did not unduly restrict the
usefulness of third-party practice. However, if an analogous restriction
requiring independent federal jurisdiction were to have been im-
posed on civil actions, the result would have been to deny the use
of third-party practice in a substantial percentage of cases, especially
those under diversity jurisdiction. The fact that the principal claim
and the third-party claim would often be based on the same occurrence
or transaction98 establishes a geographical focus which reduces the
likelihood that all the participants, both original and third-party,
would be of diverse citizenship. In order to salvage the purpose of
third-party practice-the adjudication of interrelated claims in a single
action-the federal courts in diversity cases developed the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, it is unnecessary to show
independent federal jurisdiction over a third-party claim made in a
diversity suit. To qualify for ancillary jurisdiction one need only
show that the person against whom the claim is asserted "is or may
be liable to [the defendant] for all or part of the plaintiffs claim
against him."99
Such were the two salient differences existing prior to unification.
Since unification, third-party practice has been governed by Rule 14,
in which 14(a) applies to civil action generally,10o while a new sub-
97. Indemnity claims in admiralty were required to grow "out of the sami matter,"
former Admiralty Rule 56, note 102 infra, while such claims under the ciil rules werc
not subject to that restriction. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
98. Although it is not a strict requirement, see note 97 supra, many third.party
claims do arise out of the same transaction upon which the principal action rests.
99. Fn. R. Civ. P. 14(a). See generally 3 MooRE's FED.RAL PRncricE Or 14-5.26.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. (14a):
WHEN DEFENDANT IMAY BRING IN THIRD PARTY. At any time after commencement
of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and
complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. The third.party
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division, 14(c), is concerned with admiralty suits.10 1 Rule 14(c) is simi-
lar, both in content and in much of its phrasing, to former Admiralty
Rule 56.102 It might at first seem proper to view this circumstance
plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files the third.party coin-
plaint not later than 10 days after he serves his original answer. Otherwise lie must
obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the action. The person served
with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third.party
defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided
in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims
against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party de.
fendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff
has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occtrrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may
assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-patty
plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as pro.
vided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13.
Any party may move to strike the third-party claim, or for its severance or separate
trial A third-party defendant may proceed tinder this rule against any person not
a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim
made in the action against the third-party defendant. The third-party complaint, If
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, may be in rem against a vessel,
cargo, or other property subject to admiralty or maritime process in rein, in which
case references in this rule to the summons include the warrant of arrest, and ref-
erences to the third-party plaintiff or defendant include, where appropriate, the
claimant of the property arrested.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c):
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMs. When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime
claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a third-party
plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly
liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by way of remedy over,
contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the third-party plaintiff may also
demand judgment against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff, In
which event the third-party defendant shall make his defenses to the claim of the
plaintiff as well as to that of the third-party plaintiff in the manner provided In
Rule 12 and the action shall proceed as if the plaintiff had commenced it against
the third-party defendant as well as the third-party plaintiff.
102. Former Admiralty Rule 56:
RIGHT TO BRING IN PARTY JOINTLY LIABLE. In any suit, whether in rein or in per.
sonam, the claimant or respondent (as the case may be) shall be entitled to bring
in any other vessel or person (individual or corporation) who may be partly or
wholly liable either to the libellant or to such claimant or respondent by way of
remedy over, contribution or otherwise, growing out of the same matter. This
shall be done by petition, on oath, presented before or at the time of answering the
libel, or at any later time during the progress of the cause that the court may allow.
Such petition shall contain suitable allegations showing such liability, and the par.
ticulars thereof, and that such other vessel or person ought to be proceeded against
in the same suit for such damage, and shall pray that process be issued against
such vessel or person to that end. Thereupon such process shall issue, and If dutly
served, such suit shall proceed as if such vessel or person had been originally pro.
ceeded against; the other parties in the suit shall answer the petition; the claimant
of such vessel or such new party shall answer the libel; and such further proceedings
shall be had and decree rendered by the court in the suit as to law and justice shall
appertain. But every such petitioner shall, upon filing his petition, give a stipulation,
with sufficient sureties, or an approved corporate surety, to pay the libellant and
to any claimant or any new party brought in by virtue of such process, all such
costs, damages, and expenses as shall be awarded against the petitioner by time
court on the final decree, whether rendered in the original or appellate court; and
any such claimant or new party shall give the same bonds or stipulations which
are required in the like cases from parties brought in under process issued on the
prayer of a libellant.
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as establishing that the former admiralty practice, including the re-
quirement of independent jurisdiction over third-party claims, has
been preserved in its entirety in Rule 14(c). 103 However, it is ap-
propriate to seek better indications of the "purpose of the drafters"
or the "congressional understanding" 04 before relying on the mere
similarity of the new rule to the old.
In this case, examining the "literal language" of the rule and its
"intended effect"'"° does provide a superior guide to whether Rule
14(c) should be held to retain the independent jurisdiction require-
ment. The "literal language" of Rule 14(c) is silent about any juris-
dictional requirement, as, indeed, was the language of Admiralty Rule
56. The search for "intended effect" properly begins with the Ad-
visory Committee's Note to Rule 14. No intent is there expressed
with regard to the independent jurisdiction requirement. Instead, the
entire Note is devoted to a discussion of the need to preserve substi-
tute-defendant practice.1 00 The sole purpose of having a separate rule
for admiralty third-party practice thus appears to be the preservation
of the unique admiralty substitute-defendant practice. This purpose
exemplifies the general rationale for separate rules announced in the
Advisory Committee's letter of transmittal, 07 namely, to preserve
distinctive admiralty procedures. Supplemental Rules A-F preserve
the most characteristic elements of the former admiralty practice,
elements that have no real equivalent in civil practice. They provide
for in rem actions, foreign attachments, limitations of liability, and
-possessory, petitory, and partition actions. As to the instances of sepa-
rate rules for admiralty suits within the main body of civil rules, all
but Rule 14(c) follow the same pattern. Rule 9(h) preserves the unique
admiralty interlocutory appeal. Rule 38(e) retains the distinct position
of admiralty with respect to jury trial. Thus, both in theory and in
fact, separate rules for admiralty suits have a single purpose: to insure
the survival of those admiralty procedures that have no equivalents
in civil practice.
Viewed against the background of the other separate rules, Rule
14(c) is deviant. The provision for substitute-defendant practice fits
103. The availability of ancillary jurisdiction under former Admiralty Rule 56 was
expressly denied in David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 223 F. Supp. 273
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). aff'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 196-), cert. dented, 380
U.S. 976 (1965).
104. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969). See p. 1155 supra.
105. Id.
106. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. Appendi:
at 7753 (1970); 7A MooRE's FE.DFERAL PRAcricE .54[2].
107. Reproduced in 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE .11[2]. See p. 1155 supra.
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the pattern of preserving distinctive admiralty practices. No compa-
rable procedure is available for civil actions generally. But the other
element, permitting indemnity claims, is clearly not unique. In fact,
the treatment of such claims is virtually indistinguishable from the
third-party practice for all civil actions under Rule 14(a). Since the
purpose of establishing separate admiralty rules is to preserve unique
procedural features, and since third-party indemnity claims are in no
way a unique feature of former admiralty practice, it is reasonable
to apply the presumption of uniform practice to such claims. Doing
so creates a tentative conclusion that unification has created a single
procedure with respect to indemnity claims, notwithstanding their
separate mention in Rule 14(c). And since ancillary jurisdiction is
available for indemnity claims in civil actions generally, it should
also be available for indemnity claims under Rule 14(c).108 Of course,
this application of the presumption of uniform practice is subject to
the requirement that uniformity not be objectionable on constitu-
tional, jurisdictional, or substantive grounds.
These possible objections to the availability of ancillary jurisdiction
under Rule 14(c) were explored in the case of McCann v. Falgout
Boat Company. 00 In that case a seaman, injured aboard ship, brought
suit against his employer under the admiralty jurisdiction. The de-
fendant filed a third-party complaint under Rule 14(c) against the
physician who treated the plaintiff after he returned to shore. The
complaint included both indemnity and substitute-defendant claims.
The defendant, as third-party plaintiff, did not allege independent
grounds of federal jurisdiction over the third-party claims, relying
instead on the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. The court dismissed
the third-party action, holding that Rule 14(c) continued the former
admiralty impleader practice, which required independent jurisdiction
108. An alternate argument to that made in the text is that Rule 14(a) third-party
practice is available to all civil actions, including those brought tinder the admiralty
jurisdiction. Under this argument, Rule 14(c) contains additional third.party rights
for use in admiralty suits. If a defendant in an admiralty suit chose to exercise the
rights provided in Rule 14(a), the availability of ancillary jurisdiction would have to
be settled through reasoning from general principles, since Rule 14(a) has no history
of application to claims made under the admiralty jurisdiction, and is free of any
historical requirement of independent jurisdiction over such claims.
109. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968). The McCann court is not the only district court
to wrestle with this problem since unification. One of two earlier cases, Williams v.
United States, 42 F.R.D. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), avoided taking a stand. The other,
Young v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 738 (D.S.C. 1967), denied availability of ancillary
jurisdiction because the suit had commenced prior to unification and the court felt
that to recognize ancillary jurisdiction in a suit so pending would be unfair. Accordingly,
the court invoked FED. R. Civ. P. 86(a), which permits use of the former procedure In
pending cases if application of the new rules "would not be feasible or would work
injustice."
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over third-party claims. The court argued first that the intent of the
Advisory Committee was to require independent jurisdiction-an ar-
gument that has already been refuted as to indemnity claims. °10 But,
not content to rest on intent, the court also argued that recognition
of ancillary jurisdiction would violate both the Constitution and
Rule 82.
The court's constitutional objection arises from two propositions:
(1) The Seventh Amendment gives a right of jury trial to a third-
party defendant when the third-party claim is not maritime in nature,
and (2) Admiralty "tradition . . . disallows a demand for a jury in
admiralty cases."' 1 As interpreted by the court, that tradition means
that once a suit is brought in admiralty, one cannot claim a jury trial,
even of non-admiralty claims which become attached to the principal
action. Fitzgerald'1 2 is distinguished on the ground that tie Supreme
Court subsequently "acquiesced to the tradition""13 by promulgating
Rule 38(e)," 4 which explicitly refrains from expanding the right to
jury trial in admiralty cases. Following the no-jury tradition would,
in the instant case, deprive the third-party defendant of his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. In order to avoid this result, the court
refused to permit impleader and construed Rule 14(c) to require "an
independent basis of federal, and perhaps admiralty, jurisdiction"u"2
over third-party claims.
It should first be observed that the court's proposed solution, by
leaving open the possibility that non-admiralty grounds of federal
jurisdiction would satisfy Rule 14(c), does not resolve the court's jury
trial problem.
Even if diversity jurisdiction had been shown to exist over the
third-party claim in the instant case, the problem of a denial of jury
trial would have remained. The court's jury trial conundrum is the
same for third-party claims resting on federal non-admiralty jurisdic-
tion as it is for those made under ancillary jurisdiction. If the matter
is to be resolved by interpretation of Rule 14(cy, it would seem that
only independent admiralty jurisdiction would be acceptable as a
basis for third-party claims.
110. See pp. 1175-76 supra.
111. 44 F.R.D. at 43.
112. 374 U.S. 16 (1963). See p. 1166 supra.
113. 44 F.R.D. at 43-44. The court concedes the statutory exception to the tradition
for cases arising on the Great Lakes, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970).
114. Fao. R. Civ. P. 38(e):
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMNs: These rules shall not be construed to create a
right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within themeaning of Rule 9(h).
115. 44 F.R.D. at 44. Cf. 3 MooRE's FEDmAL PRAcricE ' 14.20 at 669.
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This resolution is in any case unnecessary, for the conundrum is
a phantom-a product of a basic premise that is unsupportable. Tra.
dition plays an important role in the law, but it is only one factor
among many. Fitzgerald makes it clear that the tradition of disallowing
a jury trial in admiralty matters is without constitutional roots, and
that considerations of fairness and efficient judicial administration
are strong enough to override it.1; Nor does Rule 38(e) support the
McCann position. While that rule does not create any new rights to
jury trial, neither does it purport to narrow the circumstances in which
a jury trial may be otherwise appropriate.1 17 McCann to the contrary,
Rule 38(e) does not overrule Fitzgerald, and admiralty tradition is
subordinate to the factors described in Fitzgerald when the propriety
of jury trial must be decided.
The McCann court also refrained from recognizing ancillary juris.
diction on the ground that such recognition would violate the pro-
116. Even absent Fitzgerald, tradition is subordinate to the presumption of uniforn
practice. See note 17 supra.
117. The propriety of a third-party claim is an entirely separate question front the
availability of a jury trial. The first inquiry to be made is whether tile substantive
conditions for a third-party complaint are shown to exist. The tests in Rule 14(c) to
decide this point are whether the complaint arises from the same "transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences" as the principal action and whether the third.
party defendant "may be wholly or partly liable." Once these factors are established
the appropriateness of the third-party complaint is settled. One of the objections of the
McCann court was that the third-party claims did not arise from the same "transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences." FED. R. Civ, 1'. 14(c). The previous
admiralty practice, requiring a "maritime" transaction, was held applicable. Since the
malpractice tort did not arise "upon the high seas" it was not a part of the sale
maritime occurrence as the original injury. 44 F.R.D. at 42. Here again it is useful to
distinguish between substitute-defendant claims and indemnity claims. The former,
being exclusively available in admiralty, are properly subject to the restrictive atdmiralty
definition of transaction. As to the latter, however, the presumption of uniformity
argues for an interpretation of the transaction requirement that is coextensive with the
situations under Rule 14(a) in which an indemnity third-party claim is properly made.
See note 97 supra. If the alternate approach suggested in note 108 supra is followed,
Rule 14(a) is directly applicable, which eliminates any question about the allowable
scope of "transaction."
The availability of jury trial becomes an issue only when it has been tlccided that a
third-party claim may properly be asserted. Neither tradition nor Rule 38(e) is sufficient
ground for denying a jury trial of the issues in a non-maritime third.party claim
simply because that claim has the misfortune to be attached to a principal claim resting
on the admiralty jurisdiction. Jury trial of the issues in third.party claims tinder Rule
14(c) should be available on the same criteria as in claims made tinder Rule 14(a), i.e.,
regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the principal action. And at least to tile extent
that such issues are identical to those in the principal admiralty suit, that sult would
also be tried by a jury.
But this is very similar to the Fitzgerald situation. Multiple interrelated claims, resting
on varied jurisdictional grounds, some entitled to a jury trial and some not, are properly
before the court. Fitzgerald indicates that only one finder of fact, the jury, should be
used. There is no compelling distinction between the cases. In Fitzgerald the clans
were properly before the court through compliance with joinder rules. In the proposed
disposition of the McCann situation, the claims wotld be properly before the court
pursuant to third-party practice procedures. The essential point is that the claims be
properly before the court, not that they arrived there in a particular way. The Fitz-
gerald considerations of judicial economy and fairness, then, would frequently require
jury trial of all issues in both claims, not merely those issues which happen to overlap,
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hibition of Rule 82 against expanding federal jurisdiction. This is a
serious objection, for the practical effect of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction is to extend federal judicial power to controversies which
it could not independently adjudicate. But this is true regardless of
which jurisdictional grant covers the primary suit. The McCann court
does not explain, and no reason is apparent, why the use of ancillary
jurisdiction in an admiralty suit is any more violative of Rule 82 than
its employment in a diversity suit.116 The doctrine must stand or fall
as a whole.":9
No argument is made here that ancillary jurisdiction should be
available in the case of substitute-defendant claims. Since such claims
fit within the category of distinctive admiralty procedures preserved
through separate rules, the presumption of uniform practice is inap-
plicable. There is no analogous civil practice with which to achieve
uniformity. Accordingly, the former admiralty doctrines properly gov-
ern its use.120 McCann was correct insofar as it dismissed the substitute-
defendant claim for want of an independent jurisdictional basis.121
118. A panel of the Second Circuit is now on record as supporting the availability
of ancillary jurisdiction in third-party practice under Rule 14(c). Leather's lst, Inc.
v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810-11 n.13 (2d Cir. 1971). The holding in that case,
that a district court sitting in admiralty can entertain a claim based on state law if it
is rooted in the same facts as an admiralty claim, was supported by analog) to the
doctrines of pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction. Of the latter, the court said,
The effect of merger upon the former admiralty requirement of independent juris-
diction for impleader has not as yet been conclusively resolved. . . But if we
were presented with the question, it would be only with the greatest reluctance
that we would conclude that under the merged rules the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction did not extend to admiralty as well as to civil impleader. . . . Cer-
tainly the practical considerations which support the doctrine of ancillary Juris-
diction in the context of civil impleader are equally persuasive oil the admiralty
side .... In any event, we do not perceive the requirement of independent juris-
diction in pre-merger admiralty impleader to have had constitutional underpinnings.
Rather it reflected a judicial conception of the limited nature of Admiralty Rule
56 and the appropriate reach of the then distinct admiralty jurisdiction.
Id.
119. The third possible objection, having considered those which are constitutional
and jurisdictional, is that uniform availability of ancillary jurisdiction would be an
alteration of substantive law. McCann made no such argument and no plausible argu-
ment based on this premise is apparent.
120. A recent treatise agrees that it is permissible and desirable to recognize ancillary
jurisdiction under Rule 14(c), but does not suggest a distinction between indemnity
and substitute-defendant claims. 6 C. WRIGH & A. MI Ea, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PnO-
CEDURE § 1465 at 348-50 (1971).
121. Whether those jurisdictional principles should be changed is, of course, a
different question. There are strong policy reasons for retaining the requirement of
independent jurisdiction over substitute-defendant claims. Specifically, a plaintiff could
choose a cooperative defendant who would obligingly implead as a substitute de-
fendant a party whom the plaintiff could not have sued directly in federal court.
Although this danger was not regarded as especially serious in Comment. Imapleader of
Nonmaritime Claims Under Rule 14(c), 47 TrxAs L. REv. 120 (1968), avoiding collusion
is at least one reason why courts require independent jurisdiction over claims asserted
by plaintiffs against third-party defendants under Rule 14(a). See Hoskie v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). There is no reason vhy this risk
should not be given equal weight in the admiralty context.
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Unfortunately, Rule 14(c) is obscure and tends to discourage adop.
tion of the approach urged here. The repetition in 14(c) of a pro.
vision for indemnity impleader does raise the possibility that it is
intended to differ from that described in 14(a). Rule 14(c) could
profitably be redrafted to encourage an interpretation that would
promote rather than retard unification of civil practice.12- Even with-
out redrafting, however, courts could promote the unification of
civil practice by carefully distinguishing between the two kinds of
third-party practice and making ancillary jurisdiction available for
admiralty indemnity impleader under 14(c) by analogy to Rule 14(a).
Conclusion
Unintended and unwarranted distinctions survive in the unified
federal practice. That historical quirks may have survived the initial
unification attempt is understandable. But a second effort is now
needed to correct important flaws in a generally admirable structure.
Judicial reinterpretation of old doctrines, and perhaps amendment
of the rules or new legislation, will be required. It is not too soon
to begin.
122. One way of redrafting Rule 14(c) would be as follows.
(c) ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or
maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a
third-party plaintiff, may, in addition to his rights under Rule 14(a), bring in a
third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable [, either] to the plaintiff
[or to the third-party plaintiff, by way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise]
on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.
New material is in italics; portions of the existing rule to be deleted are in brackets,
The remainder of Rule 14(c), under the proposed revision, would be unchanged.
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